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I. INTRODUCTION 
A circuit split exists between the Second and Fourth Circuits 
regarding the correct standard of care to be applied under the maritime 
rescue doctrine.1  This is an important issue because the rescue doctrine 
functions as a response to the defense of contributory negligence and the 
standards used under the doctrine thereby affect the rescuer’s ability to 
recover damages for his or her injuries.2  The federal judiciary has supplied 
much of admiralty’s substantive law.  Although portions of the admiralty 
common law have been provided by the Supreme Court, a consensus of 
lower federal court decisions constitutes nearly all of the prevailing law in 
this area.3 Given the importance of the lower federal courts in admiralty 
law, the existence of a circuit split involving admiralty torts is both 
intriguing and troubling—intriguing because of the aforementioned, 
crucial role these courts play, and troubling because the circuits on either 
side of the split fail to consider the best possible solution born out of 
compromise. 
In Barlow v. Liberty Mar. Corp., the Second Circuit chose to apply 
a reasonableness standard in maritime injury cases, essentially retiring the 
rescue doctrine in the admiralty context.4  In Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge 
& Dock Co. (Furka I), the Fourth Circuit decided to apply a reckless and 
wanton standard to the rescuer’s conduct5; and in Furka v. Great Lakes 
Dredge & Dock Co. (Furka II), the Fourth Circuit chose to apply a reckless 
and wanton standard to the rescuer’s perception of the emergency 
situation.6 
This article, argues that the rescue doctrine should be modified to use 
a bifurcated standard: a reasonableness standard for the perception aspect 
of the rescue doctrine and a reckless and wanton standard for the conduct 
aspect of the rescue doctrine.  Therefore, this article disagrees with both 
sides of the circuit split, discussed in detail below, and instead suggests 
that a hybrid solution is the best reform option. 
Part II explains the necessary background with regard to the principle 
cases and major concepts involved.  Part III provides critical analysis, 
including justifications for borrowing from terrestrial torts to solve an 
                                                                                                                                     
 1 Barlow v. Liberty Mar. Corp., 746 F.3d 518, 526 (2d Cir. 2014); Furka v. Great 
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 755 F.2d 1085, 1087 (4th Cir. 1985) [hereinafter Furka I]; 
Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 824 F.2d 330, 331 (4th Cir. 1987) [hereinafter 
Furka II]. 
 2 Barlow, 746 F.3d at 524. 
 3 W. Eugene Davis, The Role of Federal Courts in Admiralty: The Challenges Facing 
the Admiralty Judges of the Lower District Courts, 75 TUL. L. REV. 1355, 1357–58 (2001). 
 4 Barlow, 746 F.3d at 529. 
 5 Furka I, 755 F.2d at 1088. 
 6 Furka II, 824 F.2d at 332. 
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admiralty tort issue.  This portion of the article contains arguments in favor 
of a reckless conduct standard, as proposed in Furka I, as well as, 
arguments in favor of a reasonable perception standard, which was 
implicitly accepted by the court in Barlow.  Part III also provides a 
discussion of how Good Samaritan statutes adopted throughout the 
country appear to mirror the article’s proposed bifurcated standard.  Part 
IV concludes. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Contributory Negligence or Fault 
The accepted definition of contributory negligence is “[c]onduct on 
the part of the plaintiff which falls below the standard of conduct to which 
he should conform for his own protection, and which is a legally 
contributing cause cooperating with the negligence of the defendant in 
bringing about the plaintiff’s harm.”7  In general, the old rule was that “the 
plaintiff’s contributory negligence bars recovery against a defendant 
whose negligent conduct would otherwise make him liable to the plaintiff 
for the harm sustained by [the plaintiff].”8  Yet, comparative negligence 
has now generally replaced the use of contributory negligence as a total 
bar to recovery.9 
Generally under a comparative negligence regime, when a plaintiff 
negligently causes their own injury, “the plaintiff’s recovery [reduces] in 
proportion to the share of responsibility the factfinder assigns to the 
plaintiff.”10  Therefore, comparative negligence only functions as a partial 
bar to a negligent plaintiff’s recovery for their own injury, rather than as a 
complete limitation. 
B. The Common Law Rescue Doctrine 
The maritime rescue doctrine functions as a response to a defendant’s 
assertion of contributory fault as a defense.11  Under the doctrine, would-
be rescuers can only be held contributorily accountable for injuries 
incurred during a rescue attempt resulting from their own reckless and 
wanton behavior.12  Therefore, under the rescue doctrine, a defendant 
alleging contributory fault is required to show that the plaintiff-rescuer 
                                                                                                                                     
 7 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 463 (Am. Law Inst. 1965). 
 8 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 467 (Am. Law Inst. 1965). 
 9 Restatement (Third) of Torts § 7 (Am. Law Inst. 2000). 
 10 Id. 
 11 Barlow v. Liberty Mar. Corp., 746 F.3d 518, 524 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 12 Id. 
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acted not only negligently, but recklessly, thereby providing the plaintiff-
rescuer with additional leeway with regard to his or her recovery.13 
Through application of the doctrine, a rescuer, who suffers injury 
while attempting to save an endangered party, may recover from a third 
party whose negligent behavior created the peril.14  Additionally, if the 
endangered party negligently caused the peril, the rescuer can potentially 
recover from the endangered party.15  The rescue doctrine “is based upon 
the principle that it is commendable to save life, and, although the person 
attempting a rescue voluntarily exposes himself to danger, the law will not 
impute to him responsibility for being injured while attempting such 
rescue.”16  Consequently, this policy also referred to as the “humanitarian 
doctrine,” “negate[s] the defense of assumption of risk.”17 
Prior to the rescue doctrine’s application in maritime rescue cases, 
the doctrine was traditionally used in terrestrial rescue cases; in fact, one 
of the earliest discussions of the rescue doctrine appeared in Wagner v. 
International R. Co., a terrestrial tort case involving a rescue attempt on 
land.18  This is one reason courts ought to feel comfortable using terrestrial 
tort cases to inform their choice of which standards to apply under the 
maritime rescue doctrine. 
C. The Circuit Split: Cases on Either Side 
1. Creation of the Split: the Second Circuit’s Barlow v. Liberty 
Mar. Corp. 
George Barlow, the plaintiff-appellant in this case, had 
approximately thirty-three years of experience working at sea prior to his 
injury on the ship, the Liberty Sun.19  He had worked as a deck hand, 
passed his merchant marine officer’s exam, licensing him “to serve as an 
officer aboard U.S. flagged cargo vessels,” later received his master’s 
license, the equivalent to a captain’s qualification, and spent his entire 
career at sea aboard assorted vessels.20  Yet, at the time of the accident, 
Barlow had no experience actually commanding a ship.21  In 2007, Barlow 
                                                                                                                                     
 13 Id. 
 14 Fulton v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 675 F.2d 1130, 1133–34 (10th Cir. 1982). 
 15 Id. at 1134. 
 16 Wolff v. Light, 169 N.W.2d 93, 98 (N.D. 1969). 
 17 Commonwealth v. Millsaps, 352 S.E.2d 311, 311–12 (Va. 1987). 
 18 Wagner v. International R. Co., 133 N.E. 437 (N.Y. 1921). 
 19 Barlow v. Liberty Mar. Corp., 746 F.3d 518, 520 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
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took what would ultimately be his last job on a vessel, a position as third 
mate on the cargo ship, Motor Vessel Liberty Sun.22 
The incident instigating this lawsuit occurred two months after 
Barlow began employment on the Liberty Sun.23  At the time of the 
incident, the Liberty Sun was moored alongside a floating grain elevator 
at a loading terminal in a Brazilian port on the Amazon River.24  Moreover, 
a tug boat was positioned on the starboard bow of the Liberty Sun at all 
times, in order “to fend the ship off the [loading] terminal.”25 
The accident resulting in Barlow’s injury occurred three days after 
the mooring of the vessel alongside the terminal.26  At that time, one of the 
forward breast lines parted.27  The ship’s second mate was serving as “the 
watch officer when the line parted.”28  Upon seeing the parted line, the 
second mate immediately notified the ship’s captain, who subsequently 
instructed him to assemble the crew and to reattach the line.29  The captain 
next instructed the Chief Engineer to start the ship’s engine.30 
The situation progressed from bad to worse when roughly five 
minutes after the breast line parted, the starboard bow line parted.31  As 
became evident later, whenever an additional line parted, the remaining 
lines were placed under increased strain.32  At this point, the second mate 
“noted that the remaining forward lines were also in danger of snapping,” 
so he “ordered the boatswain to slacken the lines.”33  Based on the second 
mate’s description of the events, the court understood him to mean that the 
primary problem with the lines was that they were continuing to pay out 
slowly, despite the fact that the brakes controlling the lines were 
engaged.34  As the second mate and boatswain were handling the issue, the 
rest of the crew assembled and “Barlow was the last crew member to arrive 
on the scene.”35 
                                                                                                                                     
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. at 520–21. To partially control the ship’s movement, the Liberty Sun had six 
lines securing it to mooring buoys: three lines forward, two lines aft, and one line off the 
port quarter. Barlow, 746 F.3d at 521. The ship also had two starboard breast lines—lines 
running perpendicular to the ship in order to control its distance from the pier—which were 
connected to lines from the shore. Id. 
 25 Barlow, 746 F.3d at 521. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. at 522. 
 31 Barlow, 746 F.3d at 522. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
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Despite being the last crew member on the ship to arrive, and 
although outranked by the second mate, Barlow attempted to take charge 
of the situation by first starting an argument with the second mate about 
the best manner in which to slacken the line.36  In response to Barlow’s 
actions, the second mate stated that other members of the crew were 
dealing with the issue and ordered Barlow to do nothing.37  Thereafter, 
Barlow tried to get the captain to intervene by unsuccessfully attempting 
to call him on the ship’s telephone system.38  When this failed, Barlow 
took matters into his own hands and addressed “one of the winches that 
controlled the forward mooring lines.”39 
The court noted that the standard protocol “for operating a winch is 
to first start the motor,” before putting it in gear, and to only then release 
the brake.40  This method ensures that one either pays out or takes in the 
line using the motor as a means of controlling the speed at which the line 
pays out.41  But, Barlow decided to use his own method, instead of 
following protocol, which he called “bumping the brake.”42  This method 
involved his “bump[ing]” the brake’s handle “to loosen the brake’s grip 
on the winch,” without engaging the motor.43  He stated that in his mind, 
“bumping the brake” would be quicker and save him from having to reach 
underneath the winch, near the precariously taut line, to start the motor.44  
However in reality, Barlow’s actions resulted in the line paying out 
uncontrollably, whipping around the winch, and hitting him.45  After 
sustaining this injury, Barlow remained on the Liberty Sun for a week and 
received treatment locally.46  Nevertheless, his wound became infected, 
forcing him to return home to the United States.47 
In 2008, in the Eastern District of New York, Barlow brought this 
action “against his employer, the Liberty Sun in rem, and the various 
entities associated with its ownership, management, and operation, in 
personam.”48  He asserted claims for damages under a theory of 
negligence, as well as a claim of unseaworthiness against the owners of 
                                                                                                                                     
 36 Id. 
 37 Barlow, 746 F.3d at 522. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Barlow, 746 F.3d at 522. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
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the vessel.49  Before trial, as a response to Liberty’s claim that Barlow was 
contributorily negligent, Barlow submitted proposed jury instructions 
implementing the Fourth Circuit’s “maritime rescue doctrine.”50  He 
argued that the rescue doctrine applied to him because in bumping the 
brake he was trying to rescue the ship and its crew from the danger of the 
parting lines.51  Under Barlow’s proposed instruction, the jury would be 
required to find that his conduct rose to the level of “wanton and reckless” 
behavior before it could assign any fault to him for his own injuries,.52 
The district court rejected Barlow’s suggested instructions and 
simply “gave an ‘emergency’ instruction” instead.53  Under this 
instruction, the jury was told “to consider the fact that Barlow was in a 
position where he must act quickly without opportunity for reflection, and 
that it should hold him to the standard of a ‘reasonably prudent 
[seaman] . . . faced with the same emergency.’”54  The case went to trial in 
2011, resulting in a jury verdict in favor of Defendants on the 
unseaworthiness claim, and a partial award of damages to Barlow on the 
negligence claim.55  The jury found Defendants to be ten percent at fault, 
thereby allocating ninety percent of the fault to Barlow.56  The jury totaled 
damages at $446,000.57  Therefore, Barlow was to recover only ten percent 
of the total damages, the portion of the damages allocable to Defendants—
$44,600.58 
In Barlow, the Second Circuit stated that if the Fourth Circuit’s 
approach were the law in the Second Circuit, it would have appropriately 
given an instruction on the rescue doctrine.59  The Second Circuit 
recognized that it has previously applied a regular negligence standard, 
while also noting that the existence of an emergency was a factor to be 
considered in determining damages.60  The court reasoned that because 
comparative negligence applied, rather than contributory negligence, the 
rescue doctrine’s principal purpose—to encourage rescue—largely 
disappeared.61  Moreover, it stated that the Second Circuit’s precedent 
                                                                                                                                     
 49 Barlow, 746 F.3d at 522. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. at 522–23. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. at 523. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Barlow, 746 F.3d at 523. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 See id. 
 59 Id. at 525. 
 60 Id. at 526. 
 61 Barlow, 746 F.3d at 526. 
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supported applying a reasonable person standard.62  The court ultimately 
found “no reason to adopt Barlow’s” recklessness standard and instead 
adopted a reasonable seaman standard, despite admitting that life on land 
is generally less dangerous than life at sea.63 
2. The Furka Cases From the Fourth Circuit 
a. Furka I 
Deborah Furka, the plaintiff-appellant and the administratrix of the 
estate of Paul Furka, deceased, brought an action under the Jones Act, 46 
U.S.C.S. § 30104,64 for negligence, and under general maritime law for 
the unseaworthiness of the vessel Paul Furka was operating when he 
perished.65  The case involved an alleged rescue attempt of a fellow 
employee by the decedent on the Chesapeake Bay.66  Deborah Furka is the 
widow of Paul Furka (hereinafter “Furka”), who was employed as a 
surveyor “on a large marine dike construction project” near Baltimore at 
Hart and Miller Islands in the Chesapeake Bay.67  The defendant, Great 
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. (hereinafter “Great Lakes”), was Furka’s 
employer.68  Furka held the position of “chief-of-party on the surveying 
team operating on a Boston Whaler.”69 
On a January day in 1982, a day of progressively rough weather and 
turbulent seas, one tug with a scow went adrift in the bay after losing its 
rudder and power.70  Thereafter, the captain of the tug radioed the base.71  
The subject matter of this transmission is a matter of dispute;72 according 
to plaintiff, the captain requested the removal of the scowman from his 
open boat, where he was “freezing to death,” due to being wet and cold.73  
Defendant’s evidence, contrarily, suggested that the captain did not hint at 
an emergency, but simply requested assistance with the scow.74 
                                                                                                                                     
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 The Jones Act allows a seaman, who is “injured in the course of employment,” or 
the personal representative of a seaman, who dies from such injuries, to bring a civil suit 
against the seaman’s employer.  46 U.S.C.S. § 30104 (LexisNexis 2016). 
 65 Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 755 F.2d 1085, 1087 (4th Cir. 1985) 
[Furka I]. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Furka I, 755 F.2d at 1087. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
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At the time of the captain’s call, no larger boats were available to 
rescue the disabled craft.75  Therefore, Furka took his sixteen-foot Boston 
Whaler into the rough water to save the scowman from the cold.76  But 
when Furka arrived at the scow, the stranded seaman refused to leave the 
boat.77  Furka then turned towards shore, and shortly thereafter began 
taking on water.78  He radioed for assistance, but drowned before rescuers 
arrived.79  As mentioned previously, Great Lakes denied the existence of 
any urgency to the tugboat captain’s call for help and claimed contributory 
negligence as a limitation against full recovery.80 
Following trial, the jury found that Furka qualified as a seaman and 
returned a verdict in the plaintiff’s favor on the negligence claim.81  The 
jury’s verdict favored the defendant on the unseaworthiness claim.82  The 
jury awarded $1,200,000 in damages for pecuniary loss, but limited 
Furka’s recovery by finding him to have been 65% contributorily 
negligent.83  Therefore, judgment was entered for the plaintiff in the 
amount of $420,000.84  Mrs. Furka appealed that verdict.85 
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit stated that the trial court’s jury 
instruction “failed to inform the jury that no contributory negligence may 
be inferred from a rescue attempt alone and further that no comparative 
fault may be assessed unless plaintiff’s conduct was wanton or reckless.”86  
The Fourth Circuit summarized the common law rescue doctrine stating, 
“[t]he law has so high a regard for human life that it will not impute 
negligence to an effort to preserve it, unless made under such 
circumstances as to constitute rashness.”87  The court acknowledged that 
the rescue doctrine developed when contributory negligence was the rule, 
but nevertheless concluded that admiralty law must be very hospitable to 
a man’s impulse to rescue.88  The court additionally noted that in an 
                                                                                                                                     
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Furka I, 755 F.2d at 1087. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 1087–88. 
 81 Id. at 1088. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Furka I, 755 F.2d at 1088. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. (citing Scott v. John H. Hampshire, Inc., 246 Md. 171 (1967) (quoting Maryland 
Steel Co. v. Marney, 88 Md. 428 (1898)).  See also Altamuro v. Milner Hotel, Inc., 540 F. 
Supp. 870 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Brown v. National Oil Co., 233 S.C. 345 (1958); Andrews v. 
Appalachian Electric Power Co., 192 Va. 150 (1951) (noting that an elevated regard for 
human life led to the adoption of a rash or reckless conduct standard). 
 88 Furka I, 755 F.2d at 1088–89. 
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emergency, a rescuer should not be punished for judgment errors, given 
the fact that confusion is a natural product of an urgent situation.89  
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit highlighted how the law wants to 
encourage swift responses stating that “[i]n rescue, promptness may be 
prudence,” and explained that using a reckless conduct standard 
importantly reflects the public policy purpose behind the rescue doctrine.90 
The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded the case holding that the 
lower court’s jury instruction regarding contributory negligence was plain 
error, since it did not reference the unique context of rescue.91 
b. Furka II 
At the second trial, the court instructed the jury that “the decedent 
was not at fault if he believed that a rescue was required and if a reasonably 
prudent person would have perceived the need for a rescue.”92  The parties 
agreed to a special verdict form placing two questions before the jury: (1) 
whether a rescue situation existed, and if so, (2) whether the plaintiff-
rescuer’s behavior during the rescue was wanton or reckless.93  The judge 
told the jury that in deciding whether a rescue situation manifested they 
should consider the following: (1) “did Mr. Furka perceive the need for a 
rescue?” and (2) “if so, was there cause based on all the surrounding 
circumstances for a reasonably prudent person to have perceived the call 
to rescue and thereby launch the effort of the attempt?”94 
The jury answered the first special verdict query in the negative, 
finding that no rescue situation existed in this case.95  Since the jury found 
that no rescue situation existed, the first jury’s finding that the decedent 
negligently contributed to his injuries was adopted.96  Therefore, following 
the second trial, Mrs. Furka was again awarded damages of $420,000, 
reduced through the application of comparative negligence.97 
Mrs. Furka once again appealed to the Fourth Circuit, arguing that 
the trial court erred by instructing the jury to apply a reasonable person 
standard to the perception aspect of the rescue, and that the reckless and 
                                                                                                                                     
 89 Id. at 1088 (citing Corbin v. Philadelphia, 195 Pa. 461 (1900)).  See also Rodgers v. 
Carter, 266 N.C. 564 (1966); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 470(1) (Am. Law Inst. 1965) 
(recognizing the rapid decision making that results from an emergency). 
 90 Furka I, 755 F.2d at 1088–89. 
 91 Id. at 1089. 
 92 Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 824 F.2d 330, 331 (4th Cir. 1987) [Furka 
II]. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
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wanton standard should have been applied to both facets of the rescue 
doctrine—the rescuer’s actions and the rescuer’s perception of the need 
for a rescue attempt.98  On appeal, Great Lakes conceded that Furka’s 
conduct must be evaluated under a reckless and wanton standard, however, 
the company contended that Furka’s “perception of the need for a rescue 
should be measured against that of a reasonably prudent person,” pointing 
to instances in the terrestrial tort context when a bifurcated standard has 
been applied.99 
In response, the Fourth Circuit stated its belief that bifurcating the 
rescue doctrine would trivialize it.100  Citing Wagner, the court asserted 
that in the context of rescue, perception and response are inseparable 
because both will be undertaken against the same backdrop of stress and 
imperfect knowledge.101  The court declared that bifurcating the standard 
“is to have angels dancing . . . on the head of the proverbial pin.”102  
Consequently, the Fourth Circuit held that the wanton and reckless 
standard is the correct standard to be applied under the rescue doctrine, in 
admiralty, for both the perception of the need to rescue and the rescuer’s 
conduct.103 
3. Other Circuits involved in the Split 
In Wharf v. Burlington N. R.R., the Ninth Circuit explicitly sided with 
the Fourth Circuit on the appropriate standard to be applied to a rescuer’s 
conduct.104  After finding that the plaintiff-rescuer suffered injury in 
connection with his rescue attempt, the court applied the wanton and 
reckless conduct standard under the rescue doctrine, citing Furka I.105  The 
Ninth Circuit then further explained that the evidence merely showed that 
the plaintiff-rescuer “tripped while looking away from his direction of 
travel,” which “could constitute negligence,” but “does not amount to 
reckless or wanton” behavior.106 
D. Terrestrial Tort Rescue cases and Good Samaritan Statutes 
In the context of rescue on dry land, some jurisdictions appear to 
follow the Second Circuit’s approach by applying reasonableness 
standards to both the perception and conduct aspects of the rescue 
                                                                                                                                     
 98 Furka II, 824 F.2d at 331. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. at 332. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Wharf v. Burlington N. R.R., 60 F.3d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. 
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doctrine.107  For instance, the Appellate Court in Connecticut stated that 
since contributory negligence is no longer a total bar to recovery, it 
believed the rescue doctrine does nothing more to aid injured rescuers in 
their attempts to recover damages than to help establish the causal 
connection between the defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s 
injury.108  Yet, other jurisdictions take a different approach. 
A bifurcated standard has been used under the rescue doctrine in a 
variety of cases involving torts which occurred on dry land.109  A 
bifurcated standard refers to the idea that the rescue doctrine has two 
separate aspects: a perception aspect and a conduct aspect.110  In these 
terrestrial tort cases utilizing such a split standard, a reasonableness 
standard is applied to the perception aspect, while a recklessness standard 
is applied to the conduct aspect.111  Such a bifurcated approach was taken 
at the second trial following Furka I.112 
The terrestrial tort cases using the bifurcated standard encompass a 
wide array of emergencies, exemplifying its versatility.  The factual 
situations under which it was applied include: when a car drove through 
the front window of a commercial structure,113 when a boy on a bicycle 
was hit by a car,114 when a car rolled down a driveway and into a ravine,115 
and following an incident when a state trooper endeavored to create a 
roadblock to stop a speeding motorist from evading the authorities.116 
                                                                                                                                     
 107 See Ryder Truck Rental v. Korte, 357 So. 2d 228 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); 
Sweetman v. State Highway Dep’t, 357 N.W.2d 783 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); Beatty v. 
Davis, 400 N.W.2d 850, 855 (Neb. 1987); Hughes v. Murnane Bldg. Contrs., Inc., 932 
N.Y.S.2d 782, 784 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011); Calvert v. Ourum, 595 P.2d 1264, 1267 (Or. 
Ct. App. 1979); French v. Chase, 297 P.2d 235, 239 (Wash. 1956). 
 108 Zimny v. Cooper-Jarrett, Inc., 513 A.2d 1235, 1243 (Conn. App. Ct. 1986). 
 109 See Dinsmoore v. Board of Trustees of Memorial Hosp., 936 F.2d 505, 507 (10th 
Cir. 1991); Solgaard v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 491 P.2d 821, 825 (Cal. 1971); Walker 
Hauling Co. v. Johnson, 139 S.E.2d 496, 499 (Ga. Ct. App. 1964); Padilla v. Hooks Int’l, 
Inc., 654 P.2d 574, 578 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982); Skaling v. Aetna Ins. Co., 799 A.2d 997 
n.11 (R.I. 2002); Ouellette v. Carde, 612 A.2d 687, 690 (R.I. 1992); Commonwealth v. 
Millsaps, 352 S.E.2d 311,313 (Va. 1987); Dubus v. Dresser Indus., 649 P.2d 198, 206 
(Wyo. 1982). 
 110 See Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 824 F.2d 330, 331 (4th Cir. 1987) 
[Furka II]. 
 111 See Dinsmoore, 936 F.2d at 507; Solgaard., 491 P.2d at 825; Walker Hauling Co, 
139 S.E.2d at 499; Padilla, 654 P.2d at 578; Skaling, 799 A.2d 997 n.11; Ouellette, 612 
A.2d at 689–90; Millsaps, 352 S.E.2d at 313; Dubus,, 649 P.2d 1 at 206. 
 112 Furka II, 824 F.2d at 331. 
 113 Wolff v. Light, 169 N.W.2d 93, 95–96 (N.D. 1969). 
 114 Marks v. Wagner, 370 N.E.2d 480, 482 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977). 
 115 Simmons v. Carwell, 10 So. 3d 576, 578 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008). 
 116 Commonwealth v. Millsaps, 352 S.E.2d 311, 504 (Va. 1987). 
334 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 13:321 
Good Samaritan statutes protect people who choose to aid others who 
are injured.117  Historically, such laws have been intended to decrease the 
hesitation of bystanders to help an injured party.118   Bystander hesitation 
often results from fear of suit or prosecution for unintentional injury or 
wrongful death.119  Good Samaritan statutes vary from state to state.  
Although certain states impose an affirmative obligation on people to 
provide assistance to injured parties, if they can do so without placing 
anyone in peril, the majority of states do not impose such an obligation.120  
Instead, most states provide protection from civil and/or criminal liability 
to anyone who provides assistance to injured parties, provided that all the 
statutory requirements are met.121 
Despite the variations in Good Samaritan laws, such statutes 
typically contain three basic requirements: (1) the rendering of emergency 
aid; (2) in good faith; and (3) rendered gratuitously.122  The standard of 
care for those voluntarily providing emergency assistance may vary by 
jurisdiction.  Despite some variation among jurisdictions, the applicable 
standards of care are relatively lenient in accordance with the altruistic 
purpose of Good Samaritan laws.123 
E. Maritime Law’s Historically Generous Provision of Seaman’s 
Remedies 
Historically, seamen have been provided with a variety of remedies 
for their worker injury claims.  They consequently fared better than their 
land-based counterparts, whose claims against their employers for work-
related injuries often failed.124  In large part, these claims failed because of 
the doctrine of contributory negligence, which acted as a complete bar to 
the plaintiff employee’s recovery if the plaintiff was found even slightly 
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negligent.125  Even so, while contributory negligence functioned as a total 
bar to recovery, seamen had the remedies of maintenance and cure, and 
unseaworthiness available to them.126 
In 1903, the Supreme Court noted that if a seaman falls ill or is 
wounded while serving a ship, the vessel and its owners are liable for the 
seaman’s maintenance and cure (akin to worker compensation) and for the 
seaman’s wages, at least until the end of the voyage.127  The Court also 
stated that the vessel and its owners are additionally liable to a seaman for 
injuries the seaman sustains because of the unseaworthiness of the ship or 
because of a failure to properly maintain the ship’s appurtenances.128  
Therefore, even before Congress provided seamen the ability to bring a 
negligence action against their employers based on the fault of co-
employees or the employer’s own failures, seaman already had other 
valuable remedies. 
F. The Jones Act 
This article pays special attention to the Jones Act, since both of the 
principal cases on either side of the circuit split involve fact patterns ripe 
for Jones Act claims.  The Jones Act allows one qualified as a “seaman,” 
who is injured in the course of employment, or the personal representative 
of a “seaman” killed as a result of such injury, to launch a civil action at 
law against their employer.129  Congress enacted the Jones Act leaving it 
up to the courts, in large part, to fashion remedies for injured employees 
in a manner analogous to tort remedies developed at common law.130  
Moreover, although admiralty law generally denies a litigant the right to a 
jury trial, Jones Act claims explicitly provide injured seamen “with the 
right of trial by jury.”131 
By extending the provisions of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act 
(FELA) to apply to negligence claims brought by seamen against their 
employers under the Jones Act, the Jones Act expresses that any of the 
U.S.’s laws regulating a railway employee’s recovery for personal injury 
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or death apply to seamen.132  Congress had previously adopted FELA, 
which granted interstate railroad workers the ability to bring negligence 
claims against their employers.133  FELA essentially held railroad 
employers liable, through respondeat superior, for a co-employee’s 
negligence causing injury to a fellow employee.134  Furthermore, it 
abolished the defenses of assumption of risk and the fellow servant rules, 
and stated that contributory negligence merely reduced recovery.135 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A. Justifications for Borrowing from Terrestrial Torts 
This article’s proposed solution to this circuit split is admittedly 
novel, especially because it is founded upon the idea that one attempting 
to resolve an admiralty tort issue can look outside the law of admiralty for 
ideas and suggestions.  Nevertheless, the idea of borrowing from terrestrial 
tort law to develop a solution to this particular admiralty tort issue may not 
appear unusual after one familiarizes himself with the following 
considerations, including the aforementioned Jones Act and its 
incorporation of FELA’s provisions.136 
Outside of the Jones Act context, there exist a few other general 
similarities between admiralty tort and terrestrial tort law.  For example, it 
appears that maritime law will follow the common law governing 
intentional torts.137  Furthermore, many general maritime tort cases 
involve theories of strict liability and negligence; general maritime law has 
additionally borrowed from and supplied the general common law for torts 
with regard to negligence.  For instance, the famous “Learned Hand” 
formula, which defines negligence, first appeared in a maritime case.138  
Additionally, in both maritime tort and terrestrial tort cases, the element 
of duty principally turns on the foreseeability of the risk.139 With regard to 
the question of “breach,” which asks whether a defendant failed to act 
reasonably, the maritime and common law approaches generally 
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coincide.140  Therefore, admiralty law’s historic borrowing from terrestrial 
torts supports the notion of borrowing the bifurcated standard from the 
common law of rescue and applying it to the maritime rescue doctrine. 
B.   In Support of a Recklessness Conduct Standard: Agreement with 
Furka 
1. Differences in Duty – Between Jones Act Employer & Rescue 
Doctrine Plaintiff 
Maritime law rejects the distinctions often drawn in common law 
jurisdictions between “trespassers,” “licensees,” and “invitees,” and 
instead imposes a duty of reasonable care to everyone lawfully aboard a 
vessel, and upon the owner or operator of said vessel.141  This is 
indistinguishable from the duty an employer owes his seamen, according 
to at least one federal court that has addressed the matter.142  In Gautreaux 
v. Scurlock Marine, Inc., the Fifth Circuit found that employer negligence 
is the essence of a Jones Act claim, that such negligence is the failure to 
exercise reasonable care under the circumstances, and that the employer 
thereby owes a duty of reasonable care to their employees.143  Therefore, 
Jones Act employers are held to a reasonable person standard.144  Bearing 
this in mind, the logical conclusion is that a seaman rescuer ought to be 
held to a different conduct standard—a standard other than 
reasonableness—in part because of the lack of a duty. 
As previously stated, Jones Act employers have an affirmative duty 
to act with a certain level of care towards their employees.145  The Jones 
Act holds employers liable for the negligence of any of its employees 
through its incorporation of FELA.146  However, in order for this 
negligence to be imputed to the employer, the negligence must be within 
the scope and course of the offending party’s employment.147  Building on 
the idea of control inherent in this conception of duty, the Supreme Court 
has previously ruled that a Jones Act employer cannot delegate to a third 
party, and thus escape liability for any act which is “a vital part of the 
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ship’s total operations.”148  Therefore, it appears that the relevant inquiry 
when determining whether a Jones Act employer owes a duty to a 
particular party is the same inquiry that is used at common law generally, 
i.e., did the defendant/employer maintain control over the way in which 
the work was completed by the tortfeasor?  If so, the employer is deemed 
to have been in sufficient control of the tortfeasor and liability is imputed 
to the employer.149 
In contrast, even at sea, as in Barlow and the Furka cases, no 
independent duty existed for the plaintiff employees to attempt rescues.150  
Indeed, the voluntary nature of an attempted rescue is a key element of the 
rescue doctrine’s application.  The significance of the selflessness of the 
rescue is illustrated in Ouellette v. Carde, where the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court explained that the rescue doctrine was developed for two reasons: 
(1) to encourage rescue (by those necessarily under no pre-existing duty 
to help), and (2) to correct the inequity of barring relief under contributory 
negligence “to a person who is injured in a rescue attempt which the 
injured person was under no duty to undertake.”151  This lack of a duty 
makes perfect sense because one employee typically exercises far less 
control, if any, over a co-worker, as compared to an employer.  Thus, given 
the lack of a duty under the rescue doctrine, an injured rescuer employee’s 
conduct should be held to a lower standard of care than that applied to an 
employer’s conduct. 
Nevertheless, it has been held that a Jones Act plaintiff does owe a 
duty of reasonable care to someone—himself.  In Gautreaux v. Scurlock 
Marine, Inc., the Fifth Circuit held that the employee has a duty to utilize 
reasonable care under the circumstances with regard to his own safety.152  
Even if an employee is characterized as owing himself a duty, it remains 
true that some rescuers, such as those plaintiffs involved on either side of 
the split, did not have an affirmative duty to rescue the victims.153  Using 
different standards of care for oneself and for others makes sense if one 
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considers the application of a lower standard of care to rescuer conduct a 
sort of device used to incentivize the voluntary rescue of others.154 
If a lower standard of care with regard to one’s conduct, such as a 
recklessness standard, is employed in order to spur would-be-rescuers to 
freely and selflessly undertake rescues155, it would make little sense to 
apply this lower standard to self-preservation.  Self-preservation is 
arguably the most natural, and universally held, human instinct.  Almost 
anyone in their right mind will generally strive to save themselves within 
reason.  Therefore, the duty of care owed to oneself is a duty that does not 
need to be promoted or incentivized in the same way that the law needs to 
encourage people to voluntarily come to the aid of others.  Hence, it is 
logical to apply different standards of care to the saving of others and the 
saving of oneself, given the inherent differences between selfless and 
selfish behavior. 
2. Barlow’s Approach: Thematically Inconsistent with the Jones 
Act 
Additionally, a plaintiff’s burden of proof with regard to causation 
under the Jones Act reflects the statute’s apparent purpose—to place 
increased responsibility on the employer and to allow the plaintiff 
employee to recover with greater ease.  The First Circuit has held that the 
Jones Act plaintiff’s burden of proof on causation is “featherweight.”156  
As a result, liability will be found to exist under this statute so long as the 
employer’s negligence contributed to the seaman’s injury in the slightest 
way.157  This burden of proof seems quite easy to carry. 
The placement of this lower burden of proof on the Jones Act 
plaintiff seems to comport with the statute’s purpose since it was enacted 
“for the benefit and protection of seamen[,]” who are considered the 
peculiar wards of admiralty, and since it was intended “to enlarge that 
protection, not to narrow it.”158  The remedies afforded to seamen and their 
dependents under this statute were designed to protect those who perform 
services onboard vessels and are subsequently exposed to the unique 
hazards of the sea.159  The Supreme Court has stated that this is a remedial 
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statute intended to be liberally construed, in order to further its purpose of 
protecting its wards.160  Consequently, a hybrid solution to the circuit split, 
which increases the likelihood of full recovery of damages for an injured 
rescuer-plaintiff in the maritime context, reflects the purpose and 
construction of the Jones Act, while Barlow’s full adoption of the 
reasonableness standard conflicts with the act. 
3. Criticism of Barlow: Ignoring the Rescue Doctrine’s Public 
Policy Purpose 
It proves problematic that in Barlow, the Second Circuit centers its 
discussion on contributory negligence.  In Barlow, the court focuses too 
much on the fact that contributory negligence is no longer a total bar to 
recovery.  It states that “[u]nder the district court’s jury charge, a rescuer 
may be held liable for actions that were merely unreasonable under the 
circumstances.”161  The Second Circuit chose to adopt the district court’s 
standard of care.162  Through the court’s adoption of reasonableness as the 
standard of care to be applied to all aspects of the rescue doctrine, the court 
effectively retired the rescue doctrine (at least in the maritime context).  
This characterization of the court’s decision in Barlow, as essentially 
retiring the rescue doctrine, is supported by the fact that the court focuses 
in large part on only one of the two purposes underlying the formation of 
this common law doctrine.  The purpose it chose to center on was 
contributory negligence’s function as a complete bar to recovery when the 
rescue doctrine initially developed.163 
After the Second Circuit announced its choice to adopt a reasonable 
person standard, the next paragraph of the court’s opinion discussed how 
Nineteenth and early Twentieth Century courts generally assumed, with 
regard to contributory negligence, that courts should “let losses lie where 
they fell” in instances “where both parties were blameworthy.”164  The 
court then continued to center its attention on the fact that the rescue 
doctrine was developed by courts as a method to mitigate the harshness of 
contributory negligence as a total bar to recovery.165  It is true that the 
doctrine helped avoid contributory negligence’s severe consequences by 
carving out an exception to the rule.  Yet, given all this attention to 
contributory negligence, it appears that the Second Circuit primarily 
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focused on the historical atmosphere under which the rescue doctrine 
grew, without fully recognizing that the doctrine has a second, even greater 
purpose behind it—the public policy purpose that prompted the creation 
of the rescue doctrine in the first place. 
In the Second Circuit’s defense, the court does appear to 
acknowledge this underlying policy purpose as it does briefly mention that 
“[a]lthough courts applying the doctrine of contributory negligence may 
have been willing to deny recovery to a person whose negligence 
precipitated an emergency, they hesitated before applying it to someone 
who voluntarily exposed himself to danger in order to rescue others . . . to 
protect would-be rescuers, courts created the rescue doctrine.”166  Despite 
this acknowledgement, the Second Circuit fails to adequately emphasize 
how general considerations of fairness compelled the creation of the 
rescue doctrine. 
The court does acknowledge, however, that the clearest articulation 
of the rescue doctrine in the maritime context was provided by the Fourth 
Circuit in Furka I and Furka II.167  Additionally, Barlow quotes the most 
important passage of Furka I, which clearly establishes policy 
considerations, such as the promotion of societal values, as the primary 
reason for its adoption of the wanton and reckless conduct standard under 
the rescue doctrine.168  In Furka I, the court held that the rescuer-decedent 
“could not be found contributorily liable unless his rescue attempt was 
wanton or reckless.”169  The Fourth Circuit reasoned that, “[t]he wanton 
and reckless standard reflects the value society places upon rescue[s] as 
much as any desire to avoid a total defeat of recovery under common law.  
Law must encourage an environment where human instinct is not insular 
but responds to the plight of another in peril.”170  Nonetheless, the Second 
Circuit chose to ignore Furka I’s emphasis on the underlying public policy 
purpose, in favor of concentrating its attention on the fact that times have 
changed since the creation of the rescue doctrine. 
Yet, encouraging voluntary rescues remains an extremely important 
objective.  The public policy goal of encouraging voluntary rescues when 
life is endangered pervades American law.  In Gardner v. Loomis 
Armored, the court addressed the issue of “whether an employer 
contravenes public policy when it terminates an at-will employee” for 
violating a company regulation in order to assist a citizen in danger of 
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serious injury or death.171  There, the court reasoned that terminating even 
an at-will employee for such a violation contradicted public policy because 
the plaintiff-employee’s conduct unmistakably served the policy of 
encouraging citizens to rescue others from death or serious injury.172  The 
court also reasoned that if society has previously placed the rescue of 
human life above the criminal code and constitutional rights, then this 
employee’s conduct obviously trumps a company’s work rule.173  For 
example, what would typically be an illegal use of force is lawful when 
used to protect others or oneself from injury.174  Moreover, Fourth 
Amendment protection from warrantless searches is waived under certain 
exigent circumstances, such as when the search is essential to avoid 
physical harm to officers or others.175 Thus, the court held that this rule 
contravened public policy.176 
The law has also pursued the related public policy goal of protecting 
Good Samaritans.177 In State v. Hillman, the Washington Court of Appeals 
held that the victim’s status as a “Good Samaritan,” who came to his 
murderer’s aid, was a valid aggravating factor to consider during 
sentencing.178  Reaching this conclusion, the court reflected that it “has 
long been the policy of our law to protect the ‘Good Samaritan.’”179  
Therefore, it is highly problematic that the Second Circuit chose to 
emphasize the rescue doctrine’s ties to contributory negligence at the 
expense of the public policy concerns underlying the doctrine. 
4. Barlow’s Mistake Regarding Comparative Negligence 
Moreover, Barlow mistakenly believes that comparative negligence 
abrogates the rescue doctrine.  The court praises the use of comparative 
fault given that its application allows “even a negligent rescuer” to recover 
something, as George Barlow did.180  Subsequently, because a rescuer will 
still have a chance at partial recovery for her injuries, the Second Circuit 
states, “the principle justification for the rescue doctrine—encouraging 
rescue—has largely disappeared.”181  Yet, just because a reasonable 
person standard combined with a comparative negligence regime will not 
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automatically preclude a partially negligent rescuer from any recovery 
whatsoever, does not mean that the need to encourage selfless behavior 
during life’s most dangerous moments has diminished or disappeared.  As 
Furka I illustrates, encouraging voluntary assistance in the face of great 
risk is a primary purpose behind the creation of the rescue doctrine; 
otherwise courts would not have felt the need to form an exception to the 
original contributory negligence rule in the first place.182  Courts would 
not have “hesitated before applying [contributory negligence as a total bar 
to recovery] to someone who voluntarily exposed himself to danger in 
order to rescue others from it,” if they did not view would-be rescuers as 
a special class deserving such a break.183 
Barlow fails to adequately emphasize the fact that Furka I 
acknowledged the change in law, the adoption of a comparative negligence 
regime.  The Second Circuit ends its discussion of Barlow’s negligence 
claim by highlighting that “Furka admits, the rescue doctrine came from 
a time when the rescuer’s slightest misstep could cost him any recovery 
whatsoever.  That is no longer the case.”184  Yet, the court does not point 
out that the court in Furka I consciously adopted the wanton and reckless 
conduct standard, regardless of this change, for a more important reason. 
Tradition supports the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in favor of the 
wanton and reckless conduct standard in Furka I.  There, the court noted 
that “[t]his is the standard [that has been] traditionally applied to the 
conduct of plaintiffs in rescue situations.”185  Yet, despite the 
persuasiveness of a long-standing tradition of using a lower standard of 
care in the rescue context, the Fourth Circuit does not blindly follow 
tradition without recognizing relevant changes that have been made in the 
arena of apportioning fault.  Rather, the court in Furka I considers the fact 
that the reckless and wanton standard “developed under common law, 
where contributory negligence was a complete bar to recovery,” and the 
fact that “[i]n some comparative negligence jurisdictions, not in admiralty, 
the wanton and reckless standard has thus been diluted.”186  Yet, it is 
equally true that some jurisdictions adopting comparative negligence have 
not diluted the rescue doctrine’s use of the reckless and wanton conduct 
standard. 
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Several states, in a terrestrial tort context, have chosen to apply a 
reckless and wanton conduct standard under the rescue doctrine, while also 
adhering to comparative negligence systems.187  The Supreme Court of 
Kansas reasoned that the rescue doctrine’s reckless conduct standard and 
comparative negligence could co-exist since it remained sound policy to 
promote rescue efforts.188  The court noted that using a heightened conduct 
standard under the rescue doctrine, such as a reasonableness standard, 
would “tend to operate as a deterrent to potential rescuers and penalize 
acts which would constitute ordinary negligence, but would not rise to the 
level of rash conduct.”189  The court wisely feared that such a holding 
“would be one more weapon in the arsenal of the ‘don’t-get-involved’ 
creed of citizenship,” which the court found to be “already too 
prevalent.”190  The court further reasoned that despite the state legislature’s 
adoption of comparative negligence, it has continued to utilize a standard 
of care lower than reasonableness in other statutes governing the handling 
of emergencies, namely its Good Samaritan statutes, which result in less 
liability for rescuers.191  The court also noted that the state’s Good 
Samaritan statute has been frequently amended since comparative 
negligence was implemented, so it is clear that the statute continues to 
exist intentionally, and not as the result of oversight.192  Therefore, a 
comparative negligence system does not prevent the use of limited liability 
as an incentive for would-be rescuers faced with a crisis.  Barlow 
incorrectly concludes that the advent of comparative negligence 
necessarily abrogated the rescue doctrine. 
5. The Additional Hurdles Rescuer-Plaintiffs Must Face 
Kansas is not alone in its dual adoption of comparative negligence 
and a reckless conduct standard.  Missouri has also shown that these two 
concepts can co-exist.193  In Missouri, comparative negligence has 
supplanted the rule of contributory negligence.194  The intention behind 
this change was to eliminate the inherent inequality of a doctrine that 
forced one party to take total responsibility for the conduct of both parties 
                                                                                                                                     
 187 See Solgaard v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 491 P.2d 821, 825 (Cal. 1971); Ouellette v. 
Carde, 612 A.2d 687, 690 (R.I. 1992); Commonwealth v. Millsaps, 352 S.E.2d 311, 313 
(Va. 1987); Dubus v. Dresser Indus., 649 P.2d 198, 206 (Wyo. 1982). 
 188 Bridges v. Bentley, 769 P.2d 635, 640 (Kan. 1989). 
 189 Id. 
 190 Id. 
 191 Id. at 639–40. 
 192 Id. 
 193 Allison v. Sverdup & Parcel & Associates, Inc., 783 S.W.2d 440, 451 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1987). 
 194 Id. 
2017] Maritime Rescue Doctrine 345 
involved.195  It could be argued that this is essentially what would occur 
through the use of the bifurcated standard if an injured rescuer-plaintiff’s 
conduct does not rise to the level of recklessness, thereby cutting him a 
break and allowing him full recovery of damages.  Yet, that result would 
still be fair, although involving one party’s bearing the full responsibility 
for the conduct of both parties, because the suggested standard only 
applies in a narrow category of circumstances to a limited class of rescuers.  
Thus, under the bifurcated standard, this seemingly inequitable result 
remains fair because the defendant’s negligence must have caused the peril 
that invites the rescue attempt.196  It is equitable to force the defendant to 
bear more of the burden with regard to damages when it was the 
defendant’s negligence that necessitated the injured rescuer’s involvement 
in the first place. 
In Missouri, the court noted how a defendant’s negligence remains a 
prerequisite to a plaintiff’s recovery in this situation stating, “[t]o maintain 
an action premised on the rescue doctrine, the plaintiff must allege that the 
negligence of the defendant endangered the safety of another, and that the 
plaintiff sustained injuries in an attempt to save the other from injury.”197 
This statement not only demonstrates that a defendant’s negligence is one 
of the initial hurdles a plaintiff must clear to avail himself of the rescue 
doctrine, but that a particular sort of negligence must be committed by the 
defendant, in order for a plaintiff to use the rescue doctrine. 
Additionally, the court stated that two different standards can 
potentially apply to rescuer conduct: an ordinary negligence standard if 
the rescuer created the situation of peril prompting the rescue attempt, and 
a rash or reckless standard if the rescuer was aiding another, without 
having any involvement in the creation of the initial danger.198  This 
distinction further demonstrates the importance of differentiating between 
rescuers who create the emergency and those who do not.  The Alabama 
Supreme Court also emphasized how important it is for a plaintiff to 
provide evidence of a defendant’s negligence.199  This is a basic 
prerequisite to a plaintiff’s recovery on a negligence theory, however, as a 
practical matter it functions as yet another hurdle that the plaintiff must 
clear.  The existence of multiple hurdles on the road to an injured rescuer’s 
recovery further justifies carving out a narrow category where rescuers are 
held to a lower conduct standard. 
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Furthermore, application of a recklessness standard to the conduct 
aspect of the rescue doctrine would minimize confusion.  While choosing 
to employ a reckless conduct standard under the rescue doctrine, despite 
its acceptance of comparative negligence, the Court of Appeals in Georgia 
noted how a reasonableness standard could promote confusion.200  The 
court emphasized how the commonplace understanding of the phrase 
“ordinary care” seems incongruent with a person’s voluntary placement of 
themselves in harm’s way.201  The court also considered jury confusion a 
possible byproduct of a reasonableness standard’s use in a rescue context, 
since a jury would necessarily be told that “the rescue doctrine inherently 
considers an assumption of risk as ingrained in the hazard created by the 
defendant’s negligence,” eliminating assumption of risk as a defense under 
the rescue doctrine.202  Consequently, a recklessness standard of care 
seems the most natural and least confusing standard to apply to conduct in 
the rescue context. 
C.  In Support of a Reasonable Perception Standard: Agreement with 
Barlow 
In Barlow, the Second Circuit perceptively states that “unreasonable 
rescues injure people just as surely as the emergency that begets them . . . . 
Indeed, under [Barlow’s proposed] rule, a defendant would be liable even 
if no reasonable mariner would have even thought there was an 
emergency, let alone taken the actions Barlow did.”203  Barlow proposed 
applying the rescue doctrine as it is described by the Fourth Circuit in 
Furka II.  This article agrees with the Second Circuit that the Fourth 
Circuit’s application of a recklessness standard to the perception aspect of 
the rescue doctrine would pose a problem.  As the Second Circuit clearly 
stated above, application of the recklessness standard to one’s perception 
of a situation would lead to easier recovery for even those plaintiffs who 
involve themselves in what no reasonable seaman would possibly consider 
an emergency situation.  Such a standard would allow an injured rescuer 
to recover full damages though they were unreasonable in assessing the 
situation as an emergency from the start.  This result ought to be avoided. 
Furka II explicitly rejects the idea that the rescue doctrine could be 
bifurcated so that different standards are applied to perception and 
conduct.204  In its discussion of the standard to be applied to the perception 
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aspect of the rescue doctrine, the court in Furka II cited to an early 
application of the rescue doctrine, Wagner v. International R. Co.205  The 
Fourth Circuit cites Wagner’s statement that “[t]he law does not ignore 
these reactions of the mind in tracing conduct to its consequences.  It 
recognizes them as normal.”206  It appears that Furka II noted this in an 
effort to demonstrate how the perception of an emergency and the 
subsequent handling of that emergency are closely linked. 
It is true that conduct often quickly follows perception; however, 
when this quote from Wagner is considered in the context of the entire 
paragraph, rather than in isolation, it is evident that this statement was 
made during a discussion of proximate causation and was intended to 
mean that it is natural for the plight of another to cause a rescuer to 
respond.  The sentences directly following the above quote state, 
It places [the rescuers’] effects within the range of the natural and 
probable.  The wrong that imperils life is a wrong to the imperiled 
victim; it is a wrong also to his rescuer.  The state that leaves an 
opening in a bridge is liable to the child that falls into the stream, 
but liable also to the parent who plunges to its aid.207 
The paragraph ends stating that, “[t]he wrongdoer may not have 
foreseen the coming of a deliverer.  He is accountable as if he had.”208  
Moreover, possibly the most oft quoted line from Wagner, supports the 
conclusion that the court focuses its discussion on causation issues.  The 
famous words, “[d]anger invites rescue.  The cry of distress is the 
summons of relief,” highlight a causal link in the chain of events.209  The 
court’s statements in Wagner highlight the inextricable causal link, and do 
not indicate that it is impossible to separately analyze a rescuer’s 
perception and a rescuer’s conduct. 
While rejecting the possibility of using a bifurcated standard under 
the rescue doctrine, the Fourth Circuit in Furka II also notes that rescue 
results, “more from the impulse to aid than from any process of thought or 
measure of reflection.”210  That is true, and that is why this article’s 
proposed standard does not call for deep reflection or certain verification 
that an emergency exists, but rather a rescuer’s reasonable belief under the 
circumstances that there is an emergency.  If the rescue doctrine’s ultimate 
policy goal is to facilitate the saving of lives, the law ought to temper the 
desire to endorse a wide-variety of rescue techniques, in the hopes of 
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saving imperiled persons more often, with the desire to also protect 
rescuers from suffering injuries for naught. 
Courts have recognized a difference between requiring a reasonable 
belief that an emergency exists and actual proof of an emergency.  For 
example, the Missouri Court of Appeals stated that a certain individual 
must face actual danger before another person can justifiably act at his 
own risk to avert a casualty.211  The court explained that 
[i]t is sufficient if the situation presented is such as to induce a 
reasonable belief that some person is in imminent peril.  The 
intending rescuer may act, with danger to himself if he reasonably 
had the right to assume or believe that the life or limb of another 
person is in peril.212 
Recognizing this distinction makes it easier to clear the rescue 
doctrine’s first hurdle—reasonable perception—by  accounting for a point 
Wagner makes, which is that a rescuer is usually under a great deal of 
stress and armed with imperfect knowledge when judging the need for a 
rescue.  Wyoming and Alabama also consider reasonable belief to 
sufficiently satisfy the reasonableness standard as applied to perception.213 
Additionally, a reasonable perception standard promotes the just 
functioning of the rescue doctrine.214  The rescue doctrine can only work 
fairly if it works in a way consistent with proximate causation, which 
typically centers on a determination of what is reasonably foreseeable.215  
The rescue doctrine is premised on the idea that when a defendant acts 
negligently, the defendant can anticipate a rescue attempt.216  This idea 
mirrors the preceding discussion of proximate cause in Wagner.217  The 
Fourth Circuit in Furka II seriously erred by adopting a reckless or wanton 
standard to assess a rescuer’s belief that a rescue attempt is necessary 
because that implies that even unreasonable rescue attempts are 
foreseeable to a defendant.218  The idea that one must expect people to 
intervene and attempt a rescue in a situation that no reasonable person 
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would consider an emergency is patently unfair and conflicts with general 
conceptions of proximate causation.  Therefore, reasonableness needs to 
be applied to the perception aspect of the rescue doctrine. 
D. Good Samaritan Statutes Akin to a Bifurcated Standard 
Additionally, numerous states’ Good Samaritan statutes utilize 
standards which essentially function the same way that a bifurcated 
standard would under the rescue doctrine.  For example, Iowa utilizes a 
reckless, wanton, or willful conduct standard in its Good Samaritan statute, 
while also limiting the extent to which the statute applies through its 
inclusion of a handful of other requirements.219  These additional 
limitations act similarly to the way in which a reasonable perception 
standard would, since they restrict the statute’s scope of protection based 
on time, place, and the type of assistance offered.220  The statute states that 
in order for a person to be shielded from liability for any civil damages 
resulting from that person’s omissions or acts, the person must render 
“emergency care or assistance without compensation,” “in good faith,” at 
the scene of the emergency, while the victim is being transferred from the 
scene of the emergency, or while the victim is at or being transported to 
an emergency shelter.221  These requirements all have a reasonableness 
theme, confining a rescuer’s liability protection to the time and place when 
care is most urgently needed, directly following an accident of some sort 
and at the scene of the crisis.  Other states also employ similar restrictions 
and a reckless conduct standard.222  Most other states employ comparable 
restrictions and a gross negligence conduct standard.223  Certain other 
states, such as Texas and Nebraska, appear to apply even more forgiving 
conduct standards in their Good Samaritan statutes, when examined from 
the rescuer’s point of view.224  These statutes further demonstrate the 
prevalence of the public policy protecting potential rescuers throughout 
the country, and support the idea of a bifurcated standard. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
At one end of the standard spectrum, Barlow essentially retired the 
maritime rescue doctrine by adopting a reasonable seaman standard.  At 
the other end of the standard spectrum, Furka II applied a reckless and 
wanton standard to all aspects of the maritime rescue doctrine, thereby 
allowing rescuer-plaintiffs the chance to recover for injuries sustained 
during the course of what no reasonable seaman would consider an 
emergency.  Neither extreme approach offers the best solution—a 
compromise.  The maritime rescue doctrine should use a bifurcated 
standard: applying a reasonableness standard to the rescuer’s perception 
of the situation and a recklessness standard to the rescuer’s conduct.  A 
bifurcated standard ought to apply to the maritime rescue doctrine 
because: it is thematically consistent with the purposes of the Jones Act; 
the employees at issue have no independent duty to rescue; and, such a 
standard simultaneously comports with the rescue doctrine’s underlying 
public policy purpose, and the doctrine’s strong ties to proximate causation 
and the reasonably foreseeable.  Following any other standard would 
simply add insult to a rescuer-plaintiff’s previously sustained injuries. 
